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PRIVATE BUSINESS FIRMS, HUMAN RIGHTS, 
AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE ISSUES: 
AN ORGANIZATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION PERSPECTIVE 
  
ABSTRACT 
We analyse the increasing engagement of business in the creation and application 
of self-regulatory standards in the area of human rights in the light of an emerging 
framework of transnational human rights initiatives. The voluntariness of most of 
these approaches leads to problems that are characteristic of organizational self-
regulation initiatives. Our analysis will show that these issues cannot be resolved 
simply by designing organizational structures. Rather, we argue that organizations 
need to acquire additional moral, communicative and collaborative capabilities to 
successfully contribute to the protection of human rights.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Human rights are codified in the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 
1948, which in turn is integrated into international law by means of several treaties, the 
international human rights instruments. Hence, ‘[t]he whole human rights system has been 
based on the responsibility of states’ (Clapham, 2006, p.25). In contrast, private actors are 
subject only to national legislation. However, this distribution of roles has inter alia become 
doubtful due to the increasing reach and power of transnational corporations (Ruggie, 2007). 
Such firms operate globally through intricate networks of subsidiaries, often in countries with 
poor human rights records, and potentially either benefit from these conditions, be it directly 
or indirectly, or negatively affect human rights through their operations (e.g. through 
cooperation with undemocratic governments or through environmental pollution, which 
damages health) (Kinley & Nolan, 2008). Furthermore, they have considerable bargaining 
power, often resulting in limited capacity or willingness of home and host countries to hold 
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them liable for human rights violations. As a way to tackle such problems, it is suggested that 
businesses be treated ‘as having responsibilities under the international law of human rights’ 
(Clapham, 2006, p. 270; see also Gatto, 2011). In addition, emerging regimes of ‘soft law’ are 
discussed as complements to or even substitutes for state-based ‘hard law’ (Scherer & Palazzo, 
2011). In contrast to ‘hard law’, that is, legal obligations which are legally binding, precise, 
and delegate authority, ‘soft law’ lacks one or more of these features (Abbott & Snidal, 2000). 
One distinctive feature of ‘soft law’ regimes is their lack of legal bindingness (Shelton, 2000). 
Instead, firms conforming with 'soft law' do this mainly on a voluntary basis (Scherer & 
Palazzo, 2011). 
At first glance, this development contradicts the basic assumptions of established theories of 
economics and management. In the neoclassical conceptualization of the division of labour 
between political and economic actors, the latter need to orient themselves to unambiguous 
rules created by the former (Scherer & Palazzo, 2008). Apart from that, they can – and even 
should (Friedman, 1970) – concentrate on the generation of value to contribute to the 
maximization of societal welfare (Jensen, 2002; Sundaram & Inkpen, 2004). However, 
business firms increasingly engage in self-regulation and in corporate citizenship (Matten & 
Crane, 2005), that is, they even act as authors of regulation rather than being mere objects of 
regulation. This is exemplified by corporate engagement in self-regulation by means of codes 
of conduct, e.g. concerning social and environmental standards (Scherer & Smid, 2000), child 
labour (Kolk & van Tulder, 2004) or corruption (Gordon & Miyake, 2001) as well as by 
initiatives such as the ISO 26000, in which corporate actors along with civil society groups 
create a standard for responsible corporate behaviour (Mueckenberger & Jastram, 2010). Such 
developments render the assumption of a clear-cut division of labour between private and 
public actors increasingly questionable.  
This shift can be explained as resulting from the following developments. Compared to the 
pre-globalization era, firms in general, and multinational firms in particular, are confronted 
with a much more complex environment, with regard to societal demands as well as with 
regard to competitive pressures and legal requirements. Globally active multinational 
corporations frequently operate in failed or failing states under conditions of weak or absent 
legislation and legal enforcement mechanisms or even in countries governed by regimes 
deliberately breaching internationally accepted moral rules and thus undermining human 
rights. Under such circumstances, the probability of corporations being involved in the 
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violation of such rules rises considerably. For instance, examples of conflict between business 
and human rights are ample, be it directly, as in the case of foreign direct investments, or 
indirectly through economic exchange and cooperation in complex global supply chains (Lim 
& Phillips, 2008; Locke & Romis, 2007). The picture becomes more complicated because 
globally active firms are confronted with the huge heterogeneity of values and moral demands 
(Palazzo & Scherer, 2006) at the place of operation as well as in the global markets. There 
they are confronted with diverse expectations and preferences on the one side and the need to 
compete with global competitors on the other side. 
The problem resulting from this situation is threefold: (1) Firms have increased latitude: in 
many cases they have the potential to decide which norms to apply and enforce. This is 
illustrated by the practice of forum shopping (Bell, 2003), i.e. an ‘individual petitioner's 
strategic choice to litigate her claims in one of several available adjudicatory fora’ (Helfer, 
1999: 290) and thus to minimize costs. However, in the absence of generally applicable 
values and laws, orientation is becoming increasingly difficult, potentially resulting in 
increased transaction costs. (2) Firms are confronted with increased pressures resulting from 
global competition. This pressure often leads to the exploitation of regulatory gaps at the 
expense of human rights, social standards, and the environment (Scherer & Smid, 2000). (3) 
Owing to increased sensitivity of civil society, with individual consumers (Neilson, 2010) and 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) (den Hond & de Bakker, 2007) exerting pressure on 
firms to take on responsibilities transcending their legal obligations, firms are often either 
forced to change their pattern of behaviour as a reaction to protests and boycotts, or 
preventively seek to avoid such conflicts (Zadek, 2004). 
One strategy adopted by firms to respond to such demands is the increasing engagement in 
self-regulation initiatives aimed at remedying such problems from the operational level up to 
the level of global governance (Abbott & Snidal, 2009). By the acceptance of soft-law 
instruments (Abbott & Snidal, 2000) such as the SA 8000 standard or the emerging ISO 
26000 norm for social responsibility, firms try to solve the described problems. Particularly in 
the area of human rights, the emergence of a number of approaches such as the United 
Nations Global Compact, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) Guidelines for Multinational Corporations and the United Nations ‘Norms on the 
Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to 
Human Rights’ point in the direction of a consistent framework aimed harnessing corporate 
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self-regulation for the protection of human rights. Such approaches offer some orientation for 
firms in complex and ambiguous settings. They also have the potential to generate a level 
playing field, mitigating excessive races to the bottom (Scherer & Smid, 2000). Furthermore, 
they are a means to display responsible corporate conduct to customers, regulators and civil 
society. Thus it becomes possible to reduce the pressure from civil society or even to generate 
competitive advantage in markets with a preference for goods produced in a socially or 
environmentally acceptable way. 
Acknowledging the increasing power of private actors in global governance, the self-
regulation of business that is aiming at the reconciliation of efficiency of economic activity 
with the observance of basic rights and standards needs to be regarded as one element 
available for shaping the future of global regulatory frameworks. In addition, due to its greater 
responsiveness, private regulation is even being discussed as a potential prototype for national 
and international regulation (Porter, 2005). However, despite global governance being 
characterized by a deep entanglement of the macro-level of governance with the meso-level of 
organizations, in most of the research on these issues – global governance and private self-
regulation – they are analysed separately. Current discussions of global business regulation in 
general and of self-regulation in particular do not systematically take into account the 
implications of the organizational specifics of private business firms for the viability (i.e. the 
aptitude to attain a particular goal in a generally acceptable way) of regulation. Conversely, in 
the study of organizations the confrontation of business firms with multiple regulatory 
environments and a shift in the division of power and labour between private and public 
actors are hardly reflected. Therefore, in this paper the issue of standard-setting and following 
by private actors in the area of human rights will be analysed from an organization theory 
perspective, linking the macro-perspective of the global-governance debate with the 
organizational (meso-) and the individual (micro-) perspective, both being subject to 
organization theory. The aim of these considerations is twofold: firstly, in practical terms, 
gaps in macro-level approaches to (self-)regulation will be revealed, highlighting the 
necessity for additional measures to assure the viability of such approaches. Secondly, in 
theoretical terms, our paper aims at questioning the established political assumptions 
underlying many organizational theories, highlighting some relevant and fruitful avenues for 
further research. 
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In section two, we show that multinational corporations (MNCs) have acquired a dominant 
role with a decisive impact on human rights worldwide. Macro-level approaches to regulating 
MNCs by international organizations will be described with the aim of illustrating the 
strengths and limitations of such measures. In section three, we describe the emergence of 
self-regulation as an alternative to deterrence-based legal approaches to regulation, and 
introduce the maintenance of the licence to operate as one of the main rationales for the self-
regulation of business. With the analysis of these issues we wish to shed some light on 
organizational self-regulation from a meso-level of analysis perspective. In section four, we 
will firstly advocate a forward-looking conception of responsibility, which is helpful for the 
analysis of measures aimed at meeting the demands of maintaining a licence to operate for 
business firms. Secondly, we describe how the regulatory setting for business firms has 
changed in the course of globalization, and show that these developments potentially 
exacerbate problematic aspects of the social control of organizations, such as the creation of 
socially acceptable façades while perpetuating controversial conduct. In part five, we will 
suggest organizational capabilities crucial for addressing the problems identified in section 
four. Finally, section six concludes with a short summary and describes directions for further 
research. 
 
BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: THERE IS A PROBLEM! 
The violation of human rights by business firms is illustrated by a multiplicity of examples: 
the alleged complicity of fifty firms - including IBM and Ford Motor Company – with the 
Apartheid Regime in South Africa until the 1990s (Jenkins, 2009), the hazardous working 
conditions of Chinese labourers producing components for major electronics brands (China 
Labor Watch, 2011), the ongoing involvement of Shell in human rights violations in Nigeria 
(Wheeler et al., 2002), or the issuance of personal data of dissidents to the Chinese 
government by Yahoo (Sinn, 2007). The following questions emerge from these cases: who is 
responsible for human rights violations involving globally active business firms as well as 
their home and host countries in varying constellations? And how can such violations be 
avoided? 
Common to these cases is their global nature. Due to the globality of business activity 
colliding with the confinement of binding human rights legislation to the level of nation states 
– with the exemption of ‘very few legal obligations that bind corporations operating 
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transnationally in terms of human rights’ (Kinley & Nolan, 2008: 348) – attempts to protect 
human rights by means of law are increasingly proving futile. In the following, we firstly 
analyse the reasons for this growing ineffectiveness of human rights legislation by contrasting 
the legal protection of human rights in the pre-globalization era and the altered conditions for 
such protection in a globalized economy. Subsequently, we sketch emerging approaches 
aimed at countering the negative impacts of business on human rights. 
 
Human rights in the globalized economy 
Human rights traditionally are the domain of international law. The main bodies of 
codification comprise the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 
together with international treaties translating the Universal Declaration into national laws. As 
part of international law, the protection of human rights is not considered in the responsibility 
of private actors such as individuals or corporations. Direct relevance of these laws for non-
state actors only emerges with the transformation into national legislation and the 
enforcement mechanisms of national governance. However, this division of competence is 
becoming increasingly ineffective in the light of a shift of power between nation-states and 
business firms. The immense impact of business firms on human rights in general and of 
transnational corporations in particular is acknowledged in the literature (Arnold, 2010; 
Williams & Conley, 2005; Kinley & Nolan, 2008). Examples of corporate involvement in the 
violation of human rights abound. Firstly, there is immediate impact. Ranging from payment 
of low wages to the destruction of indigenous communities, complicity with violent regimes 
and to the supply of goods used to violate human rights, corporations directly benefit from 
human rights abuses, or at least have no incentive to modify business decisions with regard to 
human rights. Secondly, business is also involved in structures that lead to the violation of 
human rights more indirectly. According to the concept of ‘structural injustice’ coined by 
Young (2004; 2006), actors are responsible for harm caused even if no direct causality 
between corporate action and injustice can be substantiated. This is the case for much of 
global value creation, connecting firms, workers and consumers from affluent and developing 
countries as well as from functioning democracies and autocratic states through complex 
supply chains. Indeed, it is argued that in many cases competitive pressures potentially lead to 
the deterioration of human rights conditions (Scherer & Smid, 2000). 
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Human rights and business: problems and potential solutions 
These developments challenge the existing human rights framework. There are several 
reasons for this. Firstly, many states often lack the capacities to enforce the observance of 
human rights even if they are formally implemented into national legislation. The reasons for 
this lack of implementation are limited resources, corruption and weak governance structures 
or legal enforcement bodies characteristic of many developing countries (World Bank, 2009). 
Secondly, several states deliberately allow, facilitate or even perpetrate the violation of human 
rights. The motivation for such behaviour is often economic, since low human rights 
standards and forced labour under certain conditions may lower costs and therefore contribute 
to the comparative advantage of a country (Busse, 2002) as well as to the wealth of powerful 
elites (Bales, 1999). 
This problematic constellation is acknowledged by a wide range of actors. On the one hand, 
since the 1970s several international organizations have formulated voluntary guidelines with 
the aim of regulating the activities of business firms (Kinley & Tadaki, 2003). Organizations 
such as the United Nations and the OECD aim to foster corporate responsibility for human 
rights, as the explicit inclusion of the topic of human rights in the OECD Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises and the appointment of a Special Representative of the Secretary 
General on human rights for transnational corporations and other business enterprises in the 
United Nations show. On the other hand, initiatives by business pursue similar goals. In the 
following, both these types of initiatives will be described briefly not only to illustrate the 
potential of novel approaches to creating business responsibility for human rights, but also to 
shed light on the problems inherent to the expansion of the responsibility for human rights 
from state actors to business firms. 
In 1976, the OECD issued the ‘Guidelines for Multinational Corporations’, aimed at 
facilitating responsible conduct of business firms, as an annex to the OECD Declaration on 
International Investment and Multinational Enterprises. In 2011, in a revised version, human 
rights became a centrepiece of these guidelines. It is explicitly stated that corporations should 
respect human rights, that is, they should prevent adverse impacts on human rights ‘that are 
directly linked to their business operations, products or services by a business relationship, 
even if they do not contribute to those impacts’ (OECD, 2011: 29).  
In 2003, the United Nations Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human 
Rights approved the ‘Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other 
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Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights’ (Human Rights Council, 2008) (‘Norms’) 
under the guidance of John Ruggie. Being endorsed by the United Nations Human Rights 
Council in 2011 within the ‘Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing 
the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework’ (Human Rights Council, 
2011), this framework defines the state duty to protect human rights, the corporate 
responsibility to respect human rights, and the necessity of remedy mechanisms for the 
victims of human rights violations.  
Further, on the level of the United Nations, the United Nations Global Compact (UNGC) has 
been founded as a voluntary initiative aimed at promoting human rights, labour rights, 
concern for the environment and measures against corruption (Williams, 2004). Business 
firms can voluntarily subscribe to the principles of the UNGC. ‘The Global Compact is not 
designed as a code of conduct. Instead, it is meant to serve as a framework of reference and 
dialogue to stimulate best practices and to bring about convergence in corporate practices 
around universally shared values’ (Kell & Ruggie, 1999: 104). Becoming a signatory includes 
making the commitment to deliver a report about the implementation of the principles of the 
UNGC in the operations of the firm. Failure to communicate will result in a change in 
participant status and possible expulsion (United Nations Global Compact, 2011). 
The fact that human rights became an explicit focus of the ‘Guidelines for Multinational 
Corporations’ as well as the increasing linkage between these guidelines, the UNGC and the 
‘Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises 
with Regard to Human Rights’ point towards the emergence of a consistent international 
regulatory matrix aimed at facilitating business firms’ respect for human rights. In addition to 
these approaches, located at the level of international organizations, are purely private 
initiatives aimed at the protection of human rights by business firms. Such initiatives either 
exclusively consist of business firms, such as the Business Social Compliance Initiative 
(Egels-Zandén & Wahlquist, 2007), or are based on the cooperation of firms and NGOs, as in 
the case of the Fair Labor Association (FLA) (for a comprehensive overview of different 
constellations of actors see Abbott & Snidal, 2009). The emergence of such private 
approaches to human rights violations by business firms is particularly interesting because 
they add a new facet to the analysis of self-regulation. The ‘Norms on the Responsibilities of 
Transnational Corporations’, the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Corporations and the 
UNGC originate on the level of international organizations and to some extent resemble 
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national legislation (even if there are considerable difference with regard to bindingness and 
precision). In such cases, business firms remain the objects of regulation. In contrast, in 
private initiatives business firms act as authors of regulation. 
 
 
OECD guidelines UNGC ’Norms’ BSCI 
date of institution 1976 2000 2003 2002 
predominant actors states states states firms 
explicit focus on human 
rights 
since 2011 yes yes yes 
level of obligation low low low low 
enforcement 
mechanisms 
weak; complaints 
at national contact 
points of the 
OECD  
weak; expulsion 
of participants if 
they fail to 
communicate 
progress 
(‘delisting’) 
no 
 
weak; 
expulsion of 
participants 
level of 
precision 
material 
precision 
low medium medium medium 
procedural 
precision 
high medium high medium 
level of delegation medium low low low 
 
Table 1: Comparison of state-led and private-led governance institutions aimed at the protection of 
human rights 
 
However, despite their differences with regard to the involvement of private actors in the 
process of rule creation, both types of initiative can be identified as ‘soft law’ (Abbott & 
Snidal, 2000). On the one hand, they exhibit a varying degree of precision (with respect to the 
content of rules as well as with respect to procedures) and delegation. ‘Precision means that 
rules unambiguously define the conduct they require, authorize, or proscribe. Delegation 
means that third parties have been granted authority to implement, interpret, and apply the 
rules; to resolve disputes; and (possibly) to make further rules’ (Abbott et al., 2000: 401). On 
the other hand, they have in common a low degree of obligation. That is, they are ‘not 
intended to create legally binding obligations’ (Abbott et al., 2000) and therefore work on a 
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voluntary basis. Accordingly, there are only weak or even no enforcement mechanisms in 
place (see Table 1, with the BSCI as one example of a private-led regulatory initiative).  
Instead of a high degree of obligation, alternative mechanisms such as market pressures are 
intended to encourage compliance with the rules. For example, the corporate responsibility to 
respect human rights in the Ruggie framework is justified by the fact that failure ‘to meet this 
responsibility can subject companies to the courts of public opinion – comprising employees, 
communities, consumers, civil society, as well as investors – and occasionally to charges in 
actual courts. Whereas governments define the scope of legal compliance, the broader scope 
of the responsibility to respect is also defined by social expectations – as part of what is 
sometimes called a company’s social license to operate’ (UN, 2008). However, taking into 
account that the effectiveness of such forces for attaining regulatory objectives is limited, the 
outcomes of voluntary approaches to regulation are difficult to predict (Abbott & Snidal, 
2009). 
To sum up, the emergence of a new form of regulation can be observed, in which private 
actors engage in the regulation of transnational business (Abbott & Snidal, 2009). The 
principle of voluntariness underlying the approaches described, on the level of international 
organizations as well as on the level of private initiatives, is illustrative for all initiatives in 
global governance in general and for those initiatives aimed at assuring the observance of 
human rights by business actors in particular. This shift from legal compliance to 
voluntariness poses two problems. First, it clashes with the assumption of a strict division of 
labour between political and economic actors and the resulting hierarchical modes of rule 
setting and observance. Secondly, thus far, the implications of this shift to voluntariness are 
mainly analyzed with respect to the macro-perspective of governance institutions. Intra-
organizational specifics and processes are only addressed in general terms, leaving unresolved 
problems of implementation. Both problems will be addressed successively in the following 
sections. 
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MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS IN THE GLOBAL SETTING: 
THE EMERGENCE OF SELF-REGULATION  
‘In its broadest sense social control is the process by which individuals, groups and 
organizations attempt to make performance, the behaviour and operations of other groups, 
organizations and individuals, conform to standards of behaviour and normative preferences’ 
(Zald, 1978: 83). With the globalization of economic activity and the concomitant shift of 
power from public to private actors (Cutler, 2001) the conditions under which such control is 
exercised have changed considerably. Whereas, in the pre-globalization era, corporate 
conduct to a large extent was regulated by law, in the contemporary globalized economy a 
shift towards more informal rules, ‘soft law’ and self-regulation can be observed (Scherer & 
Palazzo, 2011). 
In the following we describe the changing contextual conditions under which self-regulation 
is occurring as an alternative to legal deterrence-based approaches. Subsequently, we will 
argue that the eventual aim of organizational self-regulation is the maintenance of societal 
acceptance as a basis for the ‘licence to operate’, being a precondition for organizational 
survival.  
The development of self-regulation, which is increasingly supplementing and even replacing 
state-led regulation, can be regarded as rooted in two distinct developments: firstly, from the 
1970s on, governments increasingly withdrew from the provision of public goods and 
services. Instead, they resorted to the regulation of the private provision of these goods. 
Whereas regulation was originally seen as a function of states and the law, increasingly the 
thinking has prevailed that there are more efficient and effective means of regulating social 
practices (Gunningham & Rees, 1997). ‘[F]acilitating activity in markets and civil society to 
help accomplish public policy objectives’ (Parker & Braithwaite, 2003: 141) and therewith 
engaging in ‘meta regulation’ is regarded as leveraging governmental resources. This ‘New 
Governance’ model (Abbott & Snidal, 2009) is characterized by a changing role of the state, 
purposefully moving away from direct action towards more of a moderating role with the aim 
of increasing the efficiency of the economy by correcting market failure such as monopoly, 
imperfect information, and negative externalities (Majone, 1994). This ‘changing role of the 
state raises new conceptual and practical issues that are still poorly understood, let alone 
resolved’ (Majone, 1994: 98). 
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Still more complex problems result from the second development, namely the shift of power 
between political and economic actors beyond processes of delegation that are characteristic 
for New Governance. The New Governance state has been conceived to operate within 
functioning regulatory frameworks, which ultimately guarantee the binding nature of self-
regulation (Abbott & Snidal, 2009). Accordingly, self-regulation took place within the 
‘shadow of hierarchy’ (Héritier & Eckert, 2008; Scherer & Palazzo, 2011) with the threat of 
governmental regulation being imminent. Regulatory aims were formulated by regulatory 
bodies and implemented by means of organizational rules. In the course of globalization the 
power of (particularly multinational) corporations increasingly transcends the sphere of 
influence of single states. National attempts to comprehensively control or regulate corporate 
action actually or potentially are becoming increasingly futile (Crouch, 2004). In this ‘post-
national constellation’ (Habermas, 2001), soft law regimes and corporate self-regulation 
increasingly complement and even replace state legislation and control as well as previous 
regulatory attempts (see Table 2). 
 
 
state governance new governance global governance 
roles of state and 
private actors 
separated overlapping overlapping 
distribution of private 
and public roles 
strict separation of 
economic and 
political roles 
delegated spontaneous 
national regulatory 
instruments 
hard law hard law; regulation hard law; regulation; soft 
law; voluntary initiatives 
international regulatory 
instruments 
international treaties international treaties international treaties; soft 
law governance institutions; 
soft law; voluntary initiatives 
regulatory context hierarchy ‘shadow of hierarchy‘ 
heterarchy 
 
Table 2: Alternative concepts of governance 
 
In the course of this process, corporations engage in rule-making through corporate 
citizenship, participating in the formulation of a vast array of non-binding standards as well as 
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corporate political activities such as lobbying (Crouch, 2011). On the organizational level, 
compliance-based rules are increasingly complemented by codes of conduct. To be effective, 
such codes need to be part of a ‘much larger system of cultural commitments, values, 
accountability, actions, and continual improvement’ (Bondy et al., 2007: 179). By these 
means the individual capacity to behave responsibly and thereby to compensate for the 
inherent incompleteness of codes of conduct is promoted. These developments illustrate that 
the hierarchical top-down processes of regulation characteristic of the pre-globalization era 
are replaced by an intricate multiplicity of feedback-loops constituted by heterarchic 
structures of decision making (Hedlund, 1986) and network structures (Detomasi, 2007) (see 
Figure 1). 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Contrasting pre-globalization and global governance modes of rule-generation and         
 -observance 
 
This increasing complexity of regulatory dynamics renders the analysis of corporate self-
regulation challenging. Building on a framework proposed by Zald (1978), this changed 
setting can be described as follows: (1) Norms of behaviour are becoming increasingly 
heterogeneous and negotiable. Formal norms range from traditional law to voluntary 
standards. Informal rules (morals and values), being relatively stable in national contexts, 
differ widely on a global scale, increasing the requirements for business firms to identify such 
norms and ensure compliance. Furthermore, processes of individualization, even on the 
organizational rules 
and codes of conduct 
corporate citizenship, 
corporate political    
activities 
Compliance-based 
organizational  
rules 
hard law 
and soft law 
pre-globalization era global governance 
state 
firm 
individual 
state/governance 
institutions 
firm 
individual 
hard law 
rule enhancement 
   
 
 14
national level, increase the heterogeneity of norms and expectations relevant for business 
firms (Palazzo & Scherer, 2006). (2) The structural context in which regulation occurs is 
changing decisively. It is becoming less hierarchic and more heterarchic, that is, the number 
of ‘organizations or individuals attempting to determine the output of target objects’ (Zald, 
1978: 97) is increasing. (3) Surveillance as well as sanctions for non-observance of given 
rules is becoming more and more ambiguous. This is due both to the decreasing capacity of 
state actors to supervise and sanction the behaviour of business firms and to the temporal and 
spatial indirectness of the implications of corporate actions. However, new mechanisms of 
surveillance (e.g. NGOs) and sanctioning (e.g. ‘naming and shaming’) are emerging.  
In this situation the motivation of business firms to conform with given rules is changing. 
Instead of primarily avoiding sanctions resulting from an unambiguous set of rules, firms 
increasingly need to engage in self-regulation to ensure conformance with societal 
expectations (at least to a certain degree). Such conformance can be regarded as a 
precondition for the ‘licence to operate’. The ‘licence to operate’ refers to the societal 
acceptance of the operations of a firm (Scherer & Palazzo, 2011). It ranges from official 
formal licences resulting from observance of the law to the legitimacy of corporate behaviour. 
Legitimacy can be understood as ‘a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of 
an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of 
norms, values, beliefs, and definitions’ (Suchman, 1995: 574) attributed to a firm by all 
stakeholders and the whole of society (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999). The licence to operate can 
be threatened by legal accusations as well as by a breach of moral norms. The ‘licence to 
operate’ can be regarded as a necessary condition for the survival of a business firm, since 
firms require a certain level of legitimacy to secure their supply of resources (Meyer & 
Rowan, 1977). As observed by Stone, firms’ conformance with societal moral expectations 
cannot be safeguarded by means of law alone (Stone, 1975). With the decreasing regulatory 
power of nation states and with self-regulation increasingly supplementing or even replacing 
legal mechanisms, these considerations are gaining importance. 
In the location in which a business firm operates, the firm’s acceptance needs to be 
guaranteed. A striking example of the violent refusal of the licence to operate is the futile 
attempt of Tata Motors to produce their Tata Nano car in a factory to be built on land 
unlawfully granted to Tata by the government of the Indian state of West Bengal (Keohane, 
2008). It is apparent that, due to increased sensitivity of civil society and improved 
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communication, violations of moral norms potentially damage the reputation and acceptance 
of firms and also their competitiveness on a global scale. As numerous examples show, 
boycotts and negative media exposure can significantly harm the reputation of a company. 
Proactive measures to avoid such problems may be regarded as sound risk management or 
even as a struggle to compete in specific market segments, e.g. in the market for fair trade 
products. 
Furthermore, the requirement to obtain and maintain the ‘licence to operate’ essentially 
transcends the unambiguous legal and relatively homogeneous moral setting prevailing in 
national contexts. Whereas in functioning regulatory settings, firms had to adapt to 
unequivocal conditions and had only limited latitude, in a global setting the picture is much 
more ambiguous. As a result, under these circumstances, firms are increasingly confronted 
with demands to take on responsibilities which were originally the domain of national states 
but cannot be adequately addressed by them due to a shifting balance of power between 
economic and political actors. Examples are the protection of human rights (Hsieh, 2004), and 
economic development (Prahalad, 2004). Adding to the complexity of this setting is the 
dynamic inherent to rule-creation on the global level due to the emergence of structures of 
global governance. Regulations change, new initiatives emerge and the application of local 
laws on global issues is becoming more and more relevant (Maxwell et al., 2000), as the 
examples of the Alien Torts Claim Act (ATCA) (McBarnet & Schmidt, 2007), the 
development of the OECD guidelines for multinational enterprises, and the emerging 
‘Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights’ illustrate. This ongoing change of 
regulation poses considerable risk for firms, necessitates individual strategies and potentially 
leads to substantial additional expenses. 
To sum up, due to operating in increasingly heterogeneous cultural and moral environments 
and to the growing complexity of regulatory environments, business is confronted with a 
multiplicity of demands and responsibilities, which transcend their original purely economic 
role. The puzzle is to what extent current approaches aimed at ensuring the respect for human 
rights by business firms suffice to safeguard such respect and how firms, which still largely 
operate in a mode adapted to less complex conditions, can appropriately respond to these 
novel demands. 
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THE NATURE AND LIMITS OF CURRENT SELF-REGULATORY APPROACHES 
The debate about new forms of governance in a globalized setting mainly takes place in the 
areas of political science (international relations) and international law. However, many of the 
decisive actors in global governance are private business firms. For this reason, bridging 
disciplinary gaps is necessary for understanding the phenomenon of global governance and its 
various actors and institutions (Brown et al., 2010) and for finding viable approaches to self-
regulation. In particular, this is relevant for the area of human rights, in which self-regulation 
is becoming more and more central. The perspective of organizational theory seems 
indispensable in identifying particular dynamics stemming from the characteristics of private 
organizations such as business firms and for finding ways to solve the resulting problems in 
an appropriate manner. To contribute to the analysis and to eventually help identify 
preconditions for successful self-regulation, in the following we firstly carve out an 
evaluation criterion appropriate to the intricate nature of processes of private self-regulation in 
the complex and dynamic setting of global economic activity. We therefore scrutinize the 
concept of liability as a yardstick for self-regulatory endeavours. Secondly we will analyse the 
particularities of the situation in which self-regulation occurs and the peculiarities of private 
organizations crucial for the viability of self-regulatory measures. 
To properly analyse the conditions necessary for successful self-regulation of business firms 
under conditions of insufficient legal regulation and global economic exchange, it is 
important to find a suitable evaluation criterion for such measures as well as to specify factors 
decisive for the viability of self-regulation. In this section we first critically analyse the notion 
of liability, which is currently the dominant criterion for evaluating the success of self-
regulation in the existing literature. We argue that this concept is not appropriate to the 
complex causal interdependencies seen in current global business relationships. Therefore, we 
suggest switching to the notion of social connectedness as a more comprehensive and thus 
more suitable yardstick for the evaluation of the self-regulation of business. Based on these 
considerations, we then analyse to what extent self-regulatory initiatives enable firms and 
individuals to avoid the violation of human rights under conditions of complex and 
ambiguous relationships characteristic of economic exchange in a globalized setting. We 
discuss five problems considered in organizational research, which need to be taken into 
account when the viability of self-regulatory approaches is to be judged. Firstly, from the 
perspective of new institutionalism, we suggest that the potential emergence of compliance 
organizations often does not sufficiently address the critical practices that need to be 
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considered (problem of effectiveness). Second, seen from a psychological perspective, we 
think that control-centred approaches to coordination of behaviour in organizations often lead 
to unanticipated consequences or even to outcomes opposite to the goals aspired to (problem 
of efficiency). Third, the problem of a likely misfit between the potentially unlimited 
complexity of social circumstances and the relative simplicity of standards illustrate that 
voluntary standards alone may not be sufficient for the attainment of the goals of self-
regulation, such as the avoidance of negative social end ecological effects of corporate 
activity (problem of responsiveness). Fourth, the application of standards in a top-down 
manner carries the danger of illegitimacy in the eyes of employees subject to such standards 
as well as in the eyes of the (third) parties and individuals the standards are aimed to protect 
(problem of legitimacy). Fifth, there is a potential for irresolvable contradictions between the 
particular way business firms are involved in value creation and the objectives of self-
regulation. In the case of such contradictions, self-regulation might be an unsuitable approach 
to reconciling public and economic objectives (problem of coherence). Based on these 
considerations, we will describe the problems of self-regulation as the result of the mismatch 
between organizational capabilities adapted to the regulatory setting of the pre-globalization 
era and the new regulatory setting of the post-national constellation and its challenges. 
 
Towards a new logic of responsibility (liability vs. social connectedness) 
To grasp the implications of the fact that self-regulation is gaining importance for the 
protection of human rights, we draw on the concept of social connectedness (Young, 2004; 
2006), which is increasingly regarded as a necessary complement (Young, 2006) or even as a 
fruitful successor (Scherer & Palazzo, 2011) to the concept of legal liability with regard to 
global governance issues and the discussion on organizational responsibilities. The liability 
model, which ‘assigns responsibility to a particular agent (or agents) whose actions can be 
shown to be causally connected to the circumstances’ (Young, 2006: 116), is the paradigm 
upon which the majority of current self-regulatory initiatives of business are based. For 
instance, in the 2008 version of the ‘Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights’ 
responsibility is defined by the ‘sphere of influence’-conception. From this perspective, 
responsibility is directly linked to the causal connection that is characteristic of the liability 
model. However, in the 2011 document, the potentially misleading concept of ‘sphere of 
influence’ gave way to a broader reference to the responsibility of business firms to avoid 
‘adverse human rights impacts that are directly linked to their operations, products or services 
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by their business relationships, even if they have not contributed to those impacts’ (Human 
Rights Council, 2011: 14). Using similar wording, the 2011 version of the OECD Guidelines 
attempts to outline the responsibilities of business firms. 
In essence, the concept of social connectedness claims that injustice such as exploitative 
labour conditions can better be conceived of as the results of structural injustice and not as the 
outcome of particular wrongdoing of a person or an institution. Accordingly, no single 
wrongdoer can be identified. Rather, injustice can be regarded as the result of the participation 
‘of thousands or millions of people in institutions and practices that produce unjust results’ 
(Young, 2006, p. 120).  
In addition to the application in social contexts, the concept of connectedness can also be 
applied to technical domains. Modern industrial production involves a myriad of individual 
physical parts and procedural steps, applied and accomplished by a multiplicity of actors in 
various constellations such as hierarchies and cooperative relationships. Thus, liability often 
cannot be assigned to a specific actor due to the complexity of technical processes, the 
inextricable connection between technology and its application in social contexts, as well as 
of the unpredictability of technological effects, side- and after-effects (Beck, 1992). An 
illustrative example is the oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico in summer 2010. According to a 
government commission report, the failure to use certain parts cannot be unequivocally 
regarded as the direct cause for the blowoff (National Commission on the BP Deepwater 
Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling, 2011: 115). Instead, the disaster can be regarded to 
have been caused by a chain of flawed management and design processes and poor 
communication between decisive actors.  
This expansion of perspective implies a re-conceptualization of the notion of responsibility. In 
non-complex relations responsibility can be traced retrospectively to a particular culprit in 
terms of liability. In such a situation, pre-defined rules and structures are appropriate to attain 
particular outcomes and avoid undesired ones, to identify cause-and-effect relationships and 
to single out misdeeds and the irresponsible actors. In complex structural contexts however, 
the applicability of such a backward-looking concept seems to be limited. This is because new 
challenges can be inferred from prior experiences only to a limited extent. Avoiding liability 
therefore does not suffice to avoid problems indirectly caused by actors in complex cause–
effect relationships. Instead of ascribing guilt to a specific actor, a redefinition of 
responsibility as a forward-looking concept is proposed, aimed at changing and avoiding 
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structural injustice and technical risks (Young, 2006) and finding productive solutions for 
such problems (see Table 3). 
 
 
liability social connectedness 
temporal orientation backward forward 
focus guilt solution 
type of relationships 
between actors 
simple complex 
source of injustice individual action structure 
knowledge about 
causal relationships 
complete incomplete 
 
Table 3: Differences between the concepts of liability and social connectedness 
 
Considering the changed operating conditions for business in a globalized world and the 
resulting implications for the notion of responsibility, it seems appropriate to determine the 
suitability of self-regulatory measures for business according to their capacity to permit firms 
to shift from a liability-type of responsibility to a connectedness-type of responsibility and in 
this way constructively contribute to tackling the roots of problems instead of fighting only 
their symptoms. 
 
Determinants for the viability of self-regulation in the post-national constellation 
To sum up, it has become obvious that the success of self-regulatory measures is potentially 
inhibited by a number of problems. To find ways to effectively counter such problems, it is 
necessary to find their causes. In the following we argue that organizations developed certain 
capabilities to cope with the regulative setting of the pre-globalization era, which have 
continued to exist in many business firms up to now. Whereas such capabilities were already 
effective only to a limited extent in the pre-globalization-era (Stone, 1975), the increasing 
mismatch between such capabilities prevailing to date in most business firms and the novel 
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conditions of the post-national constellation will be shown as a major obstacle for the 
effectiveness of self-regulation. Based on these considerations, in the next section we describe 
the capabilities at the micro-, meso- and macro-level that are necessary to attain a fit between 
organizational capabilities and the regulatory setting. 
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Figure 2: Regulatory contexts and resulting organizational modes of rule-implementation 
 
In the pre-globalization era, the regulatory setting for firms was characterized as follows (see 
Figure 2): (1) The relevant norms for business firms were formal rules codified in the form of 
hard law. Business firms, however, had to orient to informal rules in the form of morals, 
mainly applying on the level of national or cultural communities. (2) The structural context of 
regulation was organized in a strictly hierarchical manner. Ideally, governments set the ‘rules 
of the game’, which need to be followed by business firms. (3) Surveillance of norm-
observation was conducted by designated control agents within a democratically legitimated 
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regulatory framework. Sanctioning of non-observance was accordingly exercised with 
recourse to legally entitled sanctioning power.  
This means, that in the pre-globalization era, rules for business regulation were designed on 
the macro-level of (national) society and its democratic and legal institutions. They were 
applied in a top-down fashion to individual business firms on the organizational (meso-) level 
and transformed into organizational rules applying to the members of the organization (micro-
level). In this situation, firms could be regarded as mainly passive recipients of rules created 
by public authorities and the surrounding moral communities. Similarly, members of 
regulated organizations are regarded as passive followers of organizational and legal rules. 
The direction of effects was strictly top-down. From this perspective compliance with rules on 
the meso- as well as on the micro-level was regarded as the only necessary precondition for 
conformance with societal rules and expectations transcending the economic function of 
business firms. Although changes of formal regulation (new law) as well as of informal 
regulation (changing norms and values) occur, such changes were relatively slow and 
foreseeable. Therefore, firms had sufficient time to reorient and to adapt to a changing 
regulatory setting. 
In contrast, in the post-national constellation this picture becomes decidedly more complex 
and dynamic due to two interrelated developments. On the one hand, the regulatory setting is 
changing in the following ways: (1) norms of behaviour are becoming more and more 
heterogeneous and dynamic due to the globalization of economic activity. (2) Mechanisms of 
surveillance and sanctioning are multiplying and becoming more ambiguous as a consequence 
of the diminishing regulatory power of nation states and increasing reliance on alternative 
mechanisms for societal coordination. (3) The structural context of regulation is changing 
from strict hierarchies of the nation-states to the heterarchy of global governance with public 
and private actors involved in a network-like fashion. On the other hand, business firms are 
more and more actively involved in regulatory processes, becoming regulators as well as still 
being subject to regulation.  
Under these circumstances, the boundary conditions for the regulation of corporations are 
changing decisively. We argue that the organizational structures and processes (as well as 
organizational theories), which are still predominantly adapted to the regulatory setting of the 
pre-globalization era, tend to exacerbate problems associated with the regulation of 
organizations (effectiveness, efficiency, responsiveness, legitimacy, and coherence). In the 
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following, we will describe the effect of a change to the regulatory setting on these problems. 
On this basis, in the subsequent section, we will suggest three capabilities on the level of 
organizations as necessary for the success of private self-regulation in the context of global 
governance. 
 
Effectiveness problems: The potential decoupling of structure and activity 
One problem in the context of corporate self-regulation is the propensity of organizations to 
adopt socially expected patterns of behaviour in a superficial manner without changing their 
actual behaviour. As discussed in new institutional theory, organizations tend to adopt 
socially expected formal structures to secure their legitimacy (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) and 
therewith their continuity and success (Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990) but decouple the expected 
structures from the actual activities (Behnam & MacLean, 2011; Christmann & Taylor, 2006; 
Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Weaver et al., 1999). This in effect leads to the firm appearing to 
comply with a specific standard. Obviously, such problems exist even within functioning 
regulatory frameworks and under conditions of homogeneous moral norms. Under these 
circumstances, firms have developed significant capacities to create the formally required 
façade with the aim of avoiding contradictions and maintaining activities running counter to 
external requirements (Boiral, 2007). However, in global governance with voluntary 
regulation by means of standards complementing or even replacing binding regulation, firms 
are gaining more room for manoeuvre: standards that are often primarily concentrated on 
uniformity in presentation allow for latitude in the implementation (Brunsson, 2000: 146) and 
make ‘creative compliance’ possible (McBarnet & Whelan, 1997). Beyond superficial 
compliance aimed at warding off criticism (Gatto, 2011) it is not unlikely that the problems 
actually addressed by self-regulation could remain unsolved. Furthermore, as discussed by 
Catterji and Levine (2006), external control of organizational conduct according to principles 
of responsibility might either distract attention from more serious issues or cause diversion to 
other practices beyond the focus of actual control. Finally, due to intricate cause and effect 
relationships characteristic of global economic activity, monitoring of corporate compliance 
with standards becomes difficult (Locke et al., 2009; O’Rourke, 2003) or even impossible, as 
the abovementioned case of the oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico demonstrates. With regard to 
sanctioning mechanisms, a shift from formal mechanisms applied in hierarchical structures 
(penalties, withdrawal of formal licences) towards more informal and indirect market-based 
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mechanisms potentially increases corporations’ capacity to influence judgement processes to 
their advantage, e.g. by means of marketing and public relations (Laufer, 2003). 
This means that the effectiveness of self-regulatory approaches is by no means an easy to 
gauge fact. Even if certain self-regulatory measures are taken, their ability to contribute to the 
avoidance or to the solution of targeted problems has to be analysed carefully and 
comprehensively. If not, an impressive array of self-regulatory measures, prima facie 
appearing to be comprehensive and sufficient, might prove ineffective. 
These considerations are of particular relevance in the area of human rights. Whereas the 
actual impact of corporate activity is difficult to measure (e.g. due to the remoteness of 
factories and the complexity of global supply chains), formal instruments such as the 
certification with a specific standard, are relatively easily accessible. There is thus the risk 
that formal features might be used to infer the actual human rights record of a firm. 
 
Efficiency problems: The shortcomings of control-centred approaches 
In the wake of the move of the regulatory setting away from national legal systems towards 
global governance regimes, new approaches emerged with the aim of preventing 
organizational misconduct. Among these approaches are codes of conduct, as well as 
management systems aimed at enforcing these codes (Locke et al., 2009: 320). Such systems 
are either values-based or compliance-based. Whereas the former aim at increasing the 
commitment of employees to a set of ethical ideals, the latter are ‘oriented toward rule- 
compliance and threats of punishment for noncompliance ‘(Weaver & Trevino, 1999). A 
grave problem of compliance-based programmes, which are far more prevalent than values-
based programmes (Locke et al., 2009), is their limited capacity to avoid unlawful or 
unethical conduct in complex social systems such as firms. Compliance-based approaches, if 
taken in a manner completely reliant on technical feasibility and bureaucratic practicability, 
are potentially subject to problems widely discussed in management literature.  
First, control-centred approaches potentially trigger defensive routines, that is, ‘policies or 
actions that prevent the organization from experiencing pain or threat’ (Argyris, 1986: 541). 
Such routines in turn lead to a distortion of organizational communication (Argyris, 1976) and 
‘prevent learning how to correct the causes of the threat in the first place’ (Argyris, 1986: 
541). This is a fortiori the case if self-regulatory initiatives are perceived as aiming at 
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protecting top management from blame (Treviño et al., 1999). In situations necessitating 
quick responses, be it on the operational or on the strategic level, such communicational 
distortions need to be regarded as a major impediment to the effective modification of action. 
Second, a potential side-effect of control-based approaches is the occurrence of adverse 
motivational effects. The problem here lies in the fact that control-measures to some extent 
implicitly take the effect of an allegation (McGregor, 1960), diminishing intrinsic motivation 
of employees to contribute to the solution of problems occurring in the operations of a firm. 
The potentially ‘indoctrinary’ nature of corporate compliance- and ethics-programmes 
(Stansbury & Barry, 2007) may lead either to rejection of such programmes or to the 
restriction of individual capacity for moral decision-making and initiative. Both reactions 
harbour the danger of inadequate action, in particular in non-routine situations where ready-
made solutions are not available. As argued above, the majority of ethically problematic 
situations belong to exactly this type of non-routine situations. Hence, compliance 
programmes exclusively relying on the logic of control and compliance need to be regarded as 
insufficient to render firms more responsible in situations of conflict between the goals of a 
firm and the means to achieve these goals (Paine, 1994). The fact that the implementation of 
compliance programmes is costly and leads to significant effort (Locke et al., 2009), but is 
only limitedly successful and often generates unintended and counterproductive outcomes 
illustrates a second critical aspect of organizational self-regulation: efficiency. 
 
Responsiveness problems: The limits to responding to organizational specifics and 
environmental peculiarities 
A further problem of self-regulatory approaches is that such approaches – implicitly or 
explicitly – suggest that the compliance with the relevant standard alone indicates that the 
problem being addressed is therefore solved. This issue has two facets: the first is that, from 
the perspective of a business firm, self-regulatory approaches are regarded as appropriate to 
enhance ‘the capacity and motivation of entities to regulate themselves’ (Parker, 2007: 3) and 
thus to be responsive to the specific challenges of business firms (Ayres & Braithwaite, 1992). 
The second is that, from the perspective of the problems addressed, self-regulation is regarded 
to harness the capacity of self-regulating entities to adapt to context-specific conditions (Fung, 
2003), bringing in their expertise and their skills to design economically and ethically viable 
solutions (Peters et al., 2009). However, this view fails to take into account that each problem 
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has its own specifics and that there is never only a right or a wrong answer (Santoro, 2003). 
Rather, every time a standard is applied ‘fresh judgement’ is necessary (Rasche, 2010). 
Further, it must be borne in mind that a certain level of generality (with regard to self-
regulating entities as well as with regard to environmental conditions, i.e. the object of 
regulation) cannot be avoided without impeding the efficiency of the regulated structures and 
processes. Since firms need to reduce environmental complexity to be able to operate in a 
purposeful way (Schreyögg & Steinmann, 1987), there is an essential trade-off between the 
firm-perspective and the problem-perspective of organizational self-regulation. In the pre-
globalization-era, processes of rule-making to some extent remained independent from 
considerations of firm-level efficiency. In contrast, in the case of organizational self-
regulation, the trade-off between organizational efficiency and regulatory responsiveness 
becomes immediate. This firstly materializes in a limited capacity of standards to a priori 
comprehensively address the complexity of organizations as well as that of the heterogeneous 
and dynamic nature of the context conditions of corporate action. This is particularly so in the 
context of human rights problems, where there are different personal, cultural, and moral 
viewpoints involved. This situation sharply contrasts with situations in which functioning and 
comprehensive legal frameworks, as well as homogeneous moral demands, provided an 
unambiguous point of reference for business firms. 
Secondly, the measurability of the adequacy and success of self-regulation is subject to the 
same restrictions as the process of rule-application itself, implying limits of evaluation, 
beyond which the survival of a firm is essentially threatened due to the immense effort 
necessary for the process of evaluation. Accordingly, we suggest responsiveness as a third 
factor that needs to be observed in the analysis as well as in the design of self-regulatory 
initiatives of business. 
 
Legitimacy and accountability problems of self-regulation 
In the pre-globalization era, business firms almost exclusively acted as rule followers within 
the confines of functioning regulatory frameworks. They derived their legitimacy, i.e. their 
societal acceptance, from following rules implemented by legitimate actors as well as by 
fulfilling their economic role in the market (Peter, 2004). According to this view, corporate 
accountability, that is, the obligation of an agent to report on his or her activities to an entity 
which has the ability to impose costs on the agent (Keohane, 2003), is restricted to the owners 
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of corporate shares (Peters et al., 2009) and to legal entities. This is justified by the 
assumption that all other parties affected by corporate activities are protected by the terms of 
the contract with the firm and by the legal system enforcing contracts and the law (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976; Sundaram & Inkpen, 2004). As soon as business firms operate as role-
creators beyond the reach of the rule of law of democratically legitimated nation states and 
without authorization by such states, questions of legitimacy and accountability arise (Haufler, 
2001; Wolf, 2005). This is because self-regulatory standards aiming at the restriction of 
corporate misbehaviour and at the protection of individuals and groups, potentially affected 
by this misbehaviour can be regarded as the unilateral exercise of power. 
 Therefore it is necessary to scrutinize the legitimacy and accountability of self-regulatory 
approaches, in particular in the light of the limitations described above. Legitimacy as well as 
accountability can be regarded as a precondition for the acceptance of a standard (Buchanan 
& Keohane, 2006) as well as of the standard-setting entity (Peters et al., 2009). Acceptance is 
critical from an extra-organizational perspective as well as from an intra-organizational 
perspective: on the one hand, a self-regulatory standard needs to be regarded as legitimate 
within the social context it is applied. On the other hand, employees of a company applying a 
standard need to regard it as legitimate. Otherwise the probability of lasting effectivity of the 
standard is low. 
From the perspective of the interaction of a firm with its environment, the legitimacy of a firm 
depends on the adequacy of the standards, which the firm applies, since ideally the actions of 
a firm subject to the standards are to some extent guided by these standards. The tension 
between the generality of a standard and the uniqueness of the situations in which a standard 
is to be applied (see above) carries the danger of a mismatch. If a firm acts in a way that is not 
compliant with the expectations in the host environment, it runs the risk of illegitimacy and its 
consequences, ranging from censorship in the media to direct attacks (Kostova & Zaheer, 
1999). As argued in the earlier section, such non-compliance is particularly likely in the area 
of human rights due to the highly subjective and culture-specific nature of human rights-
related issues. 
In addition, and closely related to the argumentation concerning the shortcomings of control-
centred approaches, the acceptance of a standard by the individuals who are expected to apply 
it – most often the employees of the standard-setting firm – is crucial for its effectiveness. 
Whereas it can be argued that legitimacy constitutes an element of the effectiveness of self-
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regulatory initiatives (compare the concept of pragmatic legitimacy by Suchman, 1995), we 
suggest that at a given point in time a self-regulatory measure can be effective and still be 
perceived as illegitimate, and vice versa. This is firstly due to the multiplicity of individual 
perspectives involved in processes of self-regulation and secondly to the dynamic nature of 
such processes. Thus, legitimacy can be regarded as a fourth critical aspect of organizational 
self-regulation. 
 
Coherence problems: Contradictions between the formal purpose of a firm and regulatory 
objectives 
A final problem of self-regulation is the potential incoherence between a regulatory objective 
and a firm’s operations, since regulation often threatens profit (Abbott & Snidal, 2009). This 
problem is relevant firstly on a fundamental level regarding the nature of capitalist 
organizations in general Secondly, the particular features of specific firms potentially 
contradict regulatory objectives. Both these aspects are discussed below. 
In general, in cases where the aim is to limit negative external effects resulting from the 
operation of a business, regulation tends to indirectly oppose the formal purpose of a firm. 
Since the externalization of cost increases the efficiency of firms, the criterion which is 
applied to judge organizations (Perrow, 2002), there is a fundamental tension between 
regulation of business conduct and the maximization of profit – the formal objective of 
capitalist organizations in the majority of economic theories. Due to the increasing 
incongruence of national regulatory frameworks and corporate power, human rights are 
particularly prone to being affected by negative externalities of corporate activities. Further, 
since the acceptance of such externalities often materializes as a competitive advantage for 
host countries of multinational corporations, potentially there is a fundamental trade-off 
between successful self-regulation and prevalent conceptions of economic development.  
With respect to individual firms, a contradiction between the characteristics of a firm and 
specific regulatory objectives might occur. Here the example of the conflict between a mining 
corporation and an indigenous community is illustrative (Banerjee, 2008). In this case, the 
mere operation of the corporation in the area of the community is perceived as intolerable by 
this community. Thus no form of self-regulation whatsoever is suitable to reconcile the 
completely different interests. Assuming that regulation in general is aimed at improving 
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societal welfare, the regulation of a business whose operations innately harm society, e.g. the 
tobacco industry (Palazzo & Richter, 2005), is doomed to limited effectiveness as long as the 
raison d'être of the business being regulated is not questioned. As a result, a fifth generic 
problem of organizational self-regulation can be identified: coherence. In the pre-
globalization era, this problem – despite not being completely resolvable – was addressed by 
regulation executed by national states: the internalization of negative externalities could be 
enforced by legal mechanisms, leaving limited leeway for corporations and simultaneously 
providing a level playing field for competing corporations. In contrast, in the contemporary 
global economy the exploitation of regulatory gaps potentially contributes to the competitive 
advantage of a firm, thus creating an incentive for competitors to behave similarly (Scherer & 
Smid, 2000). One means to avoid conflicts between the aim of profit maximization and 
societal expectations is the decoupling of corporate activities and structures aimed at evoking 
the impression of corporate responsibility (McLean & Behnam, 2010), as discussed above. 
 
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE VIABILITY OF PRIVATE STANDARD-SETTING AND 
APPLICATION 
To sum up, it has become apparent that current regulatory measures alone constitute only one 
step towards safeguarding effective corporate respect for human rights. Due to their macro-
perspective and the predominance of the principle of voluntariness, they fall short of taking 
into account the crucial characteristics of organizations and their specific reactions to the 
complex and ambiguous conditions under which self-regulation often takes place.  
In particular, three features can be identified which characterize the new regulatory setting 
and potentially exacerbate the problems described above (see Table 1). Firstly, due to the 
increased dynamics of the process of rule making, the inertia of processes of formal rule 
making, and to the increasing ability of firms to evade governmental regulation, gaps in 
formal regulation (which already existed in the pre-globalization era) have widened. This 
means that additional mechanisms are needed to fill (partly temporary and partly permanent) 
voids in formal rules in an appropriate and legitimate manner. Secondly, increased room for 
manoeuvre for corporations increases the complexity and ambiguity of organizational 
decision making. Finally, besides contributing to problems of legitimacy of regulation due to 
a shifting (and often unclear) balance of power between private and public actors, increased 
complexity of regulatory processes in general and corporate involvement in governance 
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processes in particular increases resource requirements. This is because relatively stable and 
efficient fora for decision making are increasingly being replaced by changing coalitions and 
multiple fora. 
Macro-level self-regulatory approaches can contribute to meeting these challenges only to a 
limited extent. They are necessary but insufficient for the attainment of regulatory objectives. 
Such initiatives can indeed provide valuable guidance in the complex operations of firms, 
such as foreign direct investment or involvement in complex global supply chains. However, 
they must not be ‘instrumentalist management tool[s] for managing troublesome groups in 
service of conventional economic goals; [they] must become an integrated part of the 
company’s approach to strategy formulation and implementation and the development of 
competencies consistent with that strategy’ (Wheeler et al., 2002). In addition it is necessary 
to take into account the specifics of organizations as complex social systems as well as the 
characteristics of the novel situation in which firms are active globally and only partially 
controllable by regulatory frameworks.  
To render organizations capable of contributing to the effectiveness of the emerging matrix of 
human rights standards, requirements on the individual level as well as on the organizational 
level need to be met. In the following we argue that on the individual level moral capabilities 
are a necessary complement to formal rules. Commitment of the members of an organization 
to a shared goal together with the alignment of incentives, and open communication are 
regarded as suitable means to sustainably improve social conditions (Locke et al., 2009). By 
these means, the necessary voids in formal regulation can be filled. Further, to address the 
increased complexity of their regulatory environments, availability of appropriate information 
as well as the capacity to process this information is crucial. Therefore, firms need the 
capability to acquire and process relevant information, and to engage in communicative 
processes with stakeholders to find legitimate solutions to problems that result from corporate 
activities. Arguably, such communicative capability needs to be anchored on the individual 
level, on the organizational (structural) level, and also on the (macro) level of the design of 
relationships between various actors engaged in processes of rule-setting and application. 
Finally, in global governance, firms, together with NGOs and international organizations, 
collectively address challenges such as the protection of human rights, often assuming the role 
of rule-creators besides their traditional role as rule-followers.  
   
 
 30
Such arrangements are regarded as a means to pool resources and competencies. They are also 
regarded as being able to enhance the legitimacy of potential solutions by means of 
combining (public) legitimacy and (private) problem solving capacities. Therefore, firms need 
to acquire the capability to collaborate with a multiplicity of different actors in different 
constellations. These capabilities and their contribution to the viability of organizational self-
regulation are summarized in Table 4. 
 
features challenges potential solution  capabilities 
incompleteness of formal 
regulation, inertia of rule-
creation and adaptation 
need to fill voids 
in formal 
regulation; lack of 
legitimacy 
enhanced individual 
problem-solving; 
deliberation  moral 
complexity and dynamism of 
regulatory requirements; 
weakening regulatory 
frameworks 
ambiguity and 
uncertainty; lack 
of legitimacy 
enhanced acquisition and 
processing of information; 
transparency; deliberation communicative 
firms are subject to regulation 
and simultaneously act as 
regulators 
lack of legitimacy 
and resources 
cooperation of different 
actors, pooling of 
resources and sources of 
legitimacy 
collaborative 
 
Table 4: Features of self-regulation in the post-national regulatory context, resulting challenges, and 
capacities for appropriate problem-solving 
 
Consequently, it is necessary to complement minimal coercive control mechanisms, which are 
still necessary to some extent, with the capacity to self-regulate (Parker & Braithwaite, 2003). 
Arguably, such capacity is located on the (micro) level of individuals, on the organizational 
(meso) level, with regard to intra-organizational processes, and on the (macro) level of 
governance emerging from the interaction of various actors engaged in regulatory processes. 
In the subsequent sections, the organizational foundations of the capacity to successfully self-
regulate will be described in detail. 
 
 
   
 
 31
Moral capabilities 
In the following, we show that the viability of corporate self-regulation in the area of human 
rights depends firstly on the capacity of the individual members to make ethically sound 
decisions. Conflicts of corporations with human rights are manifold and therefore cannot be 
appropriately managed by predefined structures and strict rules alone. Hence, as a 
complement to organizational structures and rules, individual members of an organization 
need to be able to make appropriate decisions when faced with unforeseeable situations and 
ethical dilemmas, putting into effect formally predetermined rules. Secondly, as noted above, 
ethical organizational decision-making cannot be enforced by applying pressure at the 
individual level. Rather, individuals need to be sensitized regarding potential human rights 
dilemmas and an ‘organizational climate that encourages exemplary conduct’ (Paine, 1994: 
117) needs to be established throughout an organization in general and on the level of top-
management in particular.  
On the operational level, all employees need to be able to act in a morally sound way. Due to 
the complexity of organizational contexts and the idiosyncratic nature of individual situations, 
the individual member of an organization needs firstly to be able to identify potential negative 
impacts of corporate activities on human rights; secondly, to be able to make appropriate 
decisions, and, thirdly, to disseminate decisive information within an organization to facilitate 
the change of structures, processes, and strategies if necessary. 
The requirements for ethically considered decision-making need to be met on the level of top 
management. In general, the implementation of structures necessary (but not sufficient) to 
facilitate the viability of self-regulation depend to a large extent on the commitment of top 
managers to the aims of self-regulation (Baumann, 2009). In particular, as shown by Weaver 
et al. (1999), the commitment from top management is crucial for the effective 
implementation of corporate ethics programmes. 
Appropriate moral capabilities throughout an organization are a precondition for the effective 
enactment of self-regulatory rules based on sound individual decision-making. Further, by 
these means efficiency problems can be addressed: moral commitment is conducive to fair 
solutions for problems as well as to avoiding information barriers and the resultant biased 
decision making. With respect to the problem of responsiveness, moral capabilities and the 
resulting awareness of individual employees function as a complement to organizational rules. 
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Thereby, firstly the incompleteness of formal rules can be balanced. In this way, problems 
unforeseen in organizational rules can be resolved and negative effects on the organization 
and its stakeholders can be avoided. Secondly, based on individual experiences, rules can be 
adapted and advanced. With regard to organizational legitimacy, the moral capabilities of 
individual employees and managers (Voegtlin et al., 2011) can be regarded as one important 
precondition for the attainment of legitimacy through avoidance of organizational misconduct 
and the engagement in processes of problem solving on the operational level as well as on the 
strategic level. Further, since individual decisions decisively influence the selection of 
corporate strategies as well as the selection of means for the implementation of the strategies, 
the observance of moral criteria in these processes is conducive to the avoidance of clashes 
between corporate and societal goals. 
Communicative capabilities 
As shown in strategic management theory (Ansoff, 1984; Schreyögg & Steinmann, 1987), an 
increased capacity to collect and process information is a prerequisite for organizations to 
survive in complex and dynamic environments. This also applies to the orientation of firms in 
the new regulatory setting of the post-national constellation, which is characterized by 
feedback-loops comprising the individual and the organizational level as well as the macro-
level of governance. Communication can be regarded as the way in which information about 
organizational environments is acquired and processed. Accordingly, communicative 
capabilities are necessary to successful engagement in self-regulation, taking the problems 
described above. In the following the necessity for the firm to have appropriate internal 
communication as well as the necessity for appropriate communicative processes between an 
organization and its environment for successful self-regulation will be outlined. 
As soon as communication becomes biased towards retaining information either about threats 
or about opportunities, organizational decision-making becomes inappropriate (Argyris, 1976). 
In this case, the problems of organizational self-regulation cannot be taken into account and 
an appropriate strategy becomes unlikely. Therefore, with respect to intra-organizational 
communication, an undistorted flow of communication is of the utmost importance to the 
ability of an organization to efficiently process information and thereby guarantee the 
effective application of self-regulatory standards. 
However, even if intra-organizational communication works properly, it is also necessary to 
allow for communicative processes between the organization and its environment. Open 
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communication with organizational stakeholders is firstly conducive to transparency of 
corporate activities, as exemplified by non-financial reporting. In this way the effectiveness of 
organizational self-regulation can be scrutinized by all parties concerned, contributing to the 
accountability of the corporation as well as to the accountability of the respective standard 
(Gilbert et al., 2011). Further, as argued by Fung for the case of labour standards (2003), 
deliberation and thus communication is a suitable means to enhance the legitimacy of such 
standards. By means of undistorted communication it becomes possible to continuously 
consider the appropriateness of organizational rules and to increase responsiveness to 
environmental conditions. Based on the application of the theory of deliberative democracy 
(Habermas, 1996) on economic organizations in general (Palazzo & Scherer, 2006; Scherer & 
Palazzo, 2007) and on the subject of standards in particular (Gilbert & Rasche, 2007), it is 
argued that organizations require communicative capabilities to engage in discursive problem-
solving. In particular, regarding the application of standards, such capabilities are necessary to 
deal with cultural diversity and to adapt abstract standards to local circumstances (Gilbert & 
Rasche, 2007) and eventually lead to the generation of legitimacy (Palazzo & Scherer, 2006). 
With respect to incoherence between economic and societal goals, the corporate capacity to 
engage in communicative processes with the organizational environment, e.g. with non-profit 
organizations, has the potential to improve the informational basis for organizational decision-
making and eventually to engage in more profitable and simultaneously societally acceptable 
activities (Rondinelli & London, 2003). Organizational communicative capabilities are 
exemplified by the integration of various organizational stakeholders into corporate 
governance (Gomez & Korine, 2005) as well as by departments specialized in stakeholder 
communication and the application of self-regulatory standards. 
 
Collaborative capabilities 
According to Gray, collaboration can be defined as ‘the pooling and appreciation of tangible 
resources, e.g. information, money, labor, etc. by two or more stakeholders to solve a set of 
problems which neither can solve individually’ (Gray, 1985: 912). Furthermore, the capacity 
to cooperate with various actors can be regarded as a major requirement for organizational 
learning (Simonin, 1997). Only in sustained relationships between different actors is 
appropriate communication likely to take place, facilitating organizational responsiveness to 
problems addressed by self-regulation. In the case of organizational self-regulation 
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cooperation with various actors involved in governance is a precondition for the success of 
(self-)regulation. 
With regard to tackling problems of effectiveness, the cooperation of business firms with 
multiple organizations such as auditing bodies (Mutersbaugh, 2005) and partnering firms in 
global supply chains (Fichter & Sydow, 2002) is seen as conducive to organizational self-
regulation. As soon as such collaboration between different actors takes place, a change of 
institutional logics becomes possible. Orientations pursued on the macro-level are likely to 
resonate on the individual and organizational level, enhancing the efficiency of self-regulatory 
processes due to motivational effects on the individual level and structural changes on the 
organizational level. Such a constellation potentially triggers a self-reinforcing process 
moving towards responsibility and cooperation. A further effect of the capacity to cooperate is 
the positive effect on information acquisition and transfer, both on the level of governance 
institutions – as illustrated by the learning platform of the UNGC (Ruggie, 2001) – and on the 
operational level. As shown by Locke and Romis (2007) for the improvement of working 
conditions as well as by Vachon and Klassen (2007) who focused on the improvement of 
environmental management, collaboration among different supply chain members increases 
the flow of information between the firms concerned and potentially contributes to the 
creation of rules which are responsive to the specifics of the firms involved as well as to 
context-specific conditions. With regard to legitimacy problems of organizational self-
regulation, involvement of business firms in governance initiatives is one means to safeguard 
the legitimacy of self-regulatory standards. Whereas creation and application of unilateral 
standards by business firms carries the danger of illegitimacy, corporate engagement in 
multiple-stakeholder standards is conducive to the legitimacy of standards (Bernstein & 
Cashore, 2007; Peters et al., 2009). In such cases, the legitimacy of one participant in a 
multiple stakeholder standard initiative potentially spills over to participants with lower 
legitimacy. Finally, cooperation on the level of governance institutions is conducive to 
safeguarding the coherence of corporate and societal goals. Whereas uncoordinated self-
regulation by single actors potentially impedes competitiveness, collective self-commitment is 
regarded as an appropriate means to avoid a race to the bottom (Kell and Ruggie, 1999) by 
aligning the goals of different corporations on the level of economy as well as economic and 
societal goals on the level of society. 
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Since governance schemes involving states, inter-governmental organizations, civil society 
and business are regarded to be the best way to ‘assemble all essential competencies and a 
range of motives approximating the public interest’ (Abbott & Snidal, 2009: 550), firms 
require the capacity to cooperate with these actors. Therefore, besides the capacity to 
cooperate with various actors on the level of standard-application, the capacity to collaborate 
is crucial on the level of standard-creation as well, to guarantee the viability of a self-
regulatory standard. This is illustrated by the example of the Global Reporting Initiative 
(GRI), a voluntary tool aimed at facilitating the disclosure of information on the social and 
environmental performance of companies. The viability of such a tool depends to a large 
extent on its legitimacy in the governance setting. To secure the legitimacy of standards and 
render them effective, the process of standard-creation needs to be guided by deliberative 
practices (Beisheim & Dingwerth, 2008), which can only emerge in collaborative 
relationships. Therefore the capacity to collaborate can be regarded as decisive for the success 
of self-regulation on the level of standard-application as well as on the level of standard-
creation. To sum up, on the organizational level we regard moral, communicative, and 
collaborative capabilities as necessary prerequisites for the success of self-regulation in 
general and for the success of such endeavours in the area of human rights in particular. These 
capabilities can be regarded as conditions for the avoidance and resolution of problems of 
effectiveness, efficiency, responsiveness, legitimacy, and coherence (see Table 5). 
Although these problems may not be novel, they can be exacerbated by the features of the 
post-national constellation (i.e. declining regulatory power of states and international 
organizations) and the features of self-regulatory initiatives (i.e. voluntariness and low 
precision), which address the problems resulting from this new context. Only if these 
capabilities are acquired by business firms  is the emerging matrix of human rights standards 
likely to become effective. That is, to achieve this goal, the development of new regulatory 
mechanisms on the macro-level of regulation needs to be accompanied by complementary 
changes on the organizational level. 
 
 
 
   
 
 36
 
Table 5: Contribution of moral, communicative and collaborative capabilities to the solution of 
problems of organizational self-regulation in the post-national regulatory environment 
  
problems the contribution of organizational capabilities to the solution of problems of self-regulation 
 
moral capabilities communicative 
capabilities 
collaborative 
capabilities 
effectiveness 
rule enactment (sound 
individual decision 
making) 
transparency (financial 
and non-financial 
reporting) 
transparency (GRI; 
audits: SA 8000, …) 
efficiency 
motivation; information 
acquisition 
information processing  motivational effects and 
change of institutional 
logics through 
participation in 
governance initiatives 
responsiveness 
rule enhancement; 
information acquisition 
and processing 
(individual awareness) 
information acquisition 
(interfaces and fora 
devoted to collecting 
relevant information) 
information acquisition 
(governance initiatives; 
UNGC learning platform; 
multi-stakeholder fora) 
legitimacy 
problem solving on the 
operational level; 
selection of appropriate 
strategies 
transparency; 
deliberation (interfaces 
and intra-organizational 
fora devoted to finding 
legitimate solutions) 
legitimacy spillovers 
coherence 
observance of regulatory 
goals in strategic and 
operational planning 
information acquisition 
(feed-in of relevant 
information into 
organizational decision-
making) 
goal adjustment within 
governance initiatives 
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CONCLUSION, DIRECTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH, 
AND PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS 
In this paper we argue firstly that current approaches to the protection of human rights by 
business firms with their focus on voluntary compliance with standards are necessary but 
insufficient responses to the complexity and power imbalances of contemporary global 
economic exchange relations. The emerging matrix of human rights standards provides a 
valuable orientation for corporations in a regulatory setting, in which corporate power in 
many instances transcends the regulatory power of the nation states. However, since 
instruments such as the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Corporations, the ‘Norms on the 
Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to 
Human Rights’, and the UN Global Compact are based on voluntariness and in the absence of 
formal sanctioning mechanisms, the demands for corporations to successfully self-regulate 
are rising considerably. We show that the current debate on self-regulation does not 
sufficiently take into account the characteristics of organizations, in particular in the light of 
the more demanding criterion of social connectedness. Five problems are identified which 
potentially threaten the viability of self-regulation of business: (1) the propensity of 
organizations to decouple organizational structures and activities, in particular concerning 
ethical issues; (2) the dysfunctionalities of control-centred approaches; (3) the trade-off 
between generality of rules and individuality of problems; (4) legitimacy problems resulting 
from corporate engagement in activities originally and ideally exercised by democratically 
controlled governments, without corporations being legitimated to do so; (5) contradictions 
between the formal purpose of a firm and regulatory objectives. From these issues, five 
problem-areas of self-regulation are distilled: effectiveness, efficiency, responsiveness, 
legitimacy, and coherence. 
To avoid such problems, organizational capabilities are proposed which render organizations 
capable of successfully engaging in self-regulatory endeavours and safeguard the ability of 
business to interact with society in a mutually beneficial way. These are:  
• moral capabilities enabling members of business firms to compensate for limitations 
of structural arrangements and the incompleteness of standards;  
• communicative capabilities enhancing the capacity of organizations to collect and 
process environmental information, to avoid problems by detecting them at an early 
stage of development, and to discursively tackle novel problems;  
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• collaborative capabilities enabling organizations to cooperate with partners in 
governance-processes (such as national governments, international organizations or 
NGOs) as well as with individuals and groups affected by corporate action. 
Seemingly, only if these requirements are met, can the governance of corporations be 
accomplished in a way appropriate to the increased complexity resulting from the global 
operation of multinational enterprises, the decline of state power, and the increasing 
power of private actors Only then is the emerging matrix of human rights standards likely 
to become an effective successor to the framework of human rights centred on the nation 
state as the sole relevant actor. If these requirements are disregarded, however, self-
regulation of business potentially remains a façade, while corporate action potentially 
jeopardizes social and environmental stability. 
From the theoretical viewpoint, our considerations imply that research on regulation in the 
field of political science and law needs to engage with organizational theory and take into 
account the specifics of organizations, which act simultaneously as public and as private 
actors. At the same time, organizational and management theory has to acknowledge the 
political aspects of their objects of study. This has implications for diverse areas such as 
strategy, corporate governance, and organization design. In these areas, current research is 
focused on efficiency and value generation while disregarding other corporate objectives 
(such as the observance of social and ecological goals). However, with increasing 
involvement of business firms in public policy, the traditional concentration of many 
organizational theories on the objective of profit generation has to be replaced by a much 
wider conception of the role of business in society if these theories are to be relevant (Scherer 
& Palazzo, 2007; 2011). 
Further, our considerations have practical implications on the (meso-)level of business firms 
as well as on the (macro-)level of regulatory initiatives. On the organizational level, the 
observance of moral capabilities as an explicit element of human resources policies seems to 
be one suitable measure to contribute to the success of self-regulatory initiatives. With respect 
to communicative and collaborative capabilities, an appropriate structuring of organizations 
(e.g. implementation of fora for discussions) and the participation in governance initiatives 
are first steps towards processes of sustainable learning and self-commitment which would 
lead to the effective self-regulation of business firms. On the level of regulatory initiatives, 
arrangements are needed which promote the acquisition of the capabilities described above 
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and complement them with effective enforcement mechanisms. Additionally, instead of 
tacitly assuming the compatibility of economic competition and voluntary self-regulation, 
potential conflicts between these spheres need to be made explicit. This should include the 
critical assessment of traditional concepts such as growth and welfare. However, the 
reconciliation of economic and societal objectives on a voluntary basis is unlikely to succeed 
within the established paradigms. 
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